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What Determines Welfare Losses from
Oligopoly Power in the Food and
Tobacco Industries?
Sanjib Bhuyan and Rigoberto A. Lopez
This paper estimates welfare losses in thirty-eight U.S. food and tobacco industries at the
four-digit SIC level, then relates such losses to market structure and conduct variables to
identify the welfare loss determinants. Empirical findings indicate that these losses are higher
in markets characterized by high export intensity, high advertising expenditures, economies of
scale, mergers and acquisitions, and market concentration. In addition, losses are larger in
industries that sell finished consumer products and face lower import competition.
There is a considerable volume of empirical re-
search that estimates oligopoly-induced welfare
losses in the U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing
sectors (e.g., Gisser 1982; Winner 1989; Peterson
and Connor 1995; Bhuyan and Lopez 1995). The
growing literature shows evidence of continued in-
terest in estimating such losses, partly because of
the reliance of antitrust authorities on estimates of
actual or potential welfare losses when examining
the impact of mergers and anticompetitive behav-
ior (Preston and Connor 1992). Stopping at mea-
suring welfare losses, however, leaves many ques-
tions unanswered—in particular, which factors are
mainly responsible for determining the magnitude
of these losses? Answers to such questions are im-
portant because they could guide policymakers in
selecting effective policy instruments, or deciding
whether or not it is desirable to interfere in the
markets at all. Thus, beyond measuring welfare
losses, a further relevant question involves identi-
fying the factors that are mainly responsible for
determining the magnitude of these losses.
The objective of this article is to identify and
assess the importance of underlying market struc-
ture factors responsible for oligopoly-induced
deadweight losses (welfare losses) in the U.S. food
and tobacco manufacturing industries. The losses
are computed using econometrically estimated
Lerner indices, demand elasticities, and economies
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of scale estimated at the four-digit SIC level for the
U.S. food and tobacco industries. These losses are
then regressed on a set of market structure factors
that underlie the components of the welfare
losses.1 Empirical results indicate that the alloca-
tive efficiency losses are positively and signifi-
cantly related to export intensity, market concen-
tration, advertising, and economies of scale, as
well as to merger activities. In addition, consumer
product–oriented industries and those facing lower
import competition have higher welfare losses,
Theoretical Model
Following Appelbaum (1982), the Lerner index of
oligopoly power (1%)is given by
(1)
~= (P. - MC”) e
P. ‘q
where Po, 0, -q, and MCO are oligopoly price, con-
jectural variation elasticity, the absolute value of
the price elasticity of demand, and oligopoly mar-
ginal cost, respectively. Note that 6 = Odepicts a
perfectly competitive industry, 6 = 1 a monopo-
listic one, and O <6< 1 various degrees of oli-
gopoly conduct. Following Dickson and Yu (1989)
and Bhuyan and Lopez (1995), let the industry
demand curve be given by Q = lIPT, where the
perfectly competitive output and price are indexed
to 1. Let the inverse of the industry marginal cost
(MC) be given by Q = A4t0, where e is the inverse
of marginal cost elasticity. Using equation (1), the
oligopoly price (Po) and output (QO)are given byBhuyan and Lopez We~are Lasses from Oligopoly Power 259
(2) ,“=@!,
and
The deadweight loss @lVL) can then be computed
as
(4) ~wL=J;o[(j:-Q:],Q
Note that the actual dollar value of the deadweight
losses as a percentage of observed sales (herein
referred to as DWL) is equivalent to indexed losses
as a percentage of indexed sales.2
From equation (4), it can be shown that DWL
increases with 0 and e and decreases with q, in
agreement with the simulation results of Dickson
and Yu (1989). Let Zj denote a vector of exog-
enous variables underlying 6, q, and e. Since some
of the same exogenous variables in Zj may influ-
ence more than one of these elements, our empiri-
cal approach consists of estimating the net impact
of Zj on DWL via regression analysis. While
econometrically estimated market structure and
conduct parameters (0, T, and ~) are used to com-
pute welfare loss, a reduced form equation is used
to examine the relationship between welfare loss
and the variables these market structure and con-
duct elements.
Empirical Procedures
The values for 0, q, and ~ were obtained for the
forty U.S. food and tobacco industries reported in
Bhuyan and Lopez (1997). Equation (4) and 1987
sales were then used to compute welfare losses as
a percentage of sales for each of these industries at
the four-digit SIC level. Two of these industries
did not satisfy the welfare loss model (equation
[4]) and were dropped from the study.
Next, the elements in Zj underlying 6, q, and l
were identified. In terms of the conjectural varia-
tion elasticity, it can be shown that, by using the
Clarke and Davies (1982) parameter ci and the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (H,), the conjectural
variation elasticity can be expressed as 6 = H +
cx(1 – H). In fact, ever since Cowling and Water-
son’s seminal work (1976), there has been a well-
established theoretical rationale for expecting in-
dustry profitability to be positively related to the
level of industrial concentration. Thus, we expect 6
and DWL to be positively correlated with H. More-
over, Amos, Perloff, and Perloff (1996) have
shown that H is a better indicator of industry con-
centration than are other concentration measures
such as the top four-firm concentration (CR4).
Scherer and Ross (1990) noted that oligopolistic
collusion is likely to be higher for consumer prod-
ucts because of a lack of countervailing power.
Thus a variable (CONS) representing the propor-
tion of shipments made directly to consumers (i.e.,
sales to wholesalers/retailers rather than to other
manufacturing industries) is expected to be posi-
tively correlated with DWL.
Based on the work of Esposito and Esposito
(1971) and St&hlhammer (1991), the conventional
wisdom is that industries facing import competi-
tion are more likely to be disciplined toward be-
having competitively. Thus, import intensity (MS,
the ratio of imports to total sales) is expected to be
negatively related to DWL. Field and Pagoulatos
(1996) argued that the effect of export intensity
(XS,the ratio of exports to total sales) on oligopoly
profitability (and consequently on welfare losses)
cannot be determined a priori because the relation-
ship may be negative if domestic firms are unable
to engage in price discrimination between the do-
mestic and foreign markets, while the opposite
may result if exporters, because of tariff protec-
tions, can engage in international price discrimina-
tion,
The desire to achieve or strengthen market
power was a prominent factor in mergers and ac-
quisitions of the past in the United States (Scherer
and Ross 1990). Although vigorous antitrust en-
forcement efforts have reduced competition-
inhibiting mergers, the market power motive can-
not be ruled out completely. Moreover, the nega-
tive implication of mergers, i.e., a reduction in the
level of competition in a market (Auerbach and
Reishus 1991), is also an important consideration
here. The 1980s saw numerous mergers, including
the almost $25 billion leverage buyout of RJR Na-
bisco by KKR & Co. in 1989. (This merger was
announced in 1988 and was so famous that Holly-
wood made a movie about it!) It is notable that
during this period a few firms were responsible for
most of the mergers and acquisitions (in terms of
value) in the food and tobacco industries. For ex-
ample, Phillip Morris buying General Foods (val-
ued at $5.63 billion), RJR buying Nabisco ($4.9
billion), and Nestle buying Carnation ($2.9 billion)
were responsible for almost 90% of total mergers
and acquisitions in 1985 (Mergers and Acquisi-
tions, May/June 1986). After running at a feverish
rate in the 1980s, mergers and acquisitions in the
very late 1980s and the 1990s fell sharply when a260 October 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
few companies involved in highly leveraged trans-
actions defaulted on bond issues and sought bank-
ruptcy protection while at the same time financing
costs rose sharply and prices for asset sales weak-
ened (Pickering 1991).
The potential impact of such corporate restruc-
turing activity on industry concentration, as mea-
sured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is
closely watched by the federal antitrust authorities
as horizontal mergers increase market concentra-
tion, thereby raising the possibility of increased
price and decreased social welfare (U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
1992). Although the market concentration measure
(H) is expected to capture the structural and per-
formance impact of mergers and acquisitions in the
U.S. food and tobacco industries, a mergers and
acquisitions variable (M&A) is introduced as an
explanatory variable and is expected to be posi-
tively related to DWL.
Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1986) found that the
price elasticity of industrial demand depends nega-
tively on advertising (ADV,) and research and de-
velopment (l?&D), possibly denoting product dif-
ferentiation and product development, respec-
tively. These variables are measured as the
percentage of sales and are expected to be posi-
tively related to DWL. Pagoulatos and Sorenson
also argued that demand elasticity is lower in con-
sumer products, which should reinforce the nega-
tive relation between CONS and D WL expected
above.
Where the previous literature offers little guid-
ance is on the determinants of l, which is the in-
verse of the marginal cost elasticity with respect to
output and is thus negatively related to the degree
of economies of scale (Ferguson 1979). The closest
empirical work on the determinants of ~ is the
study by Caves et al. (1980) on the determinants of
minimum efficient scale, which yielded mixed re-
sults. Harris (1988) shows that economies of scale
affect oligopoly power as a barrier to entry of po-
tential competitors. To control for the importance
of scale economies, an economies of scale dummy
variable (SCALDUM) representing those food and
tobacco industries with economies of scale is in-
cluded as an explanatory variable. This control
variable was constructed using the reported esti-
mates of scale economies by Bhuyan and Lopez
(1997). Those food and tobacco industries (e.g.,
meat packing) that had economies of scale were
assigned the value 1. The economies of scale vari-
able, SCALDUM, is expected to be positively re-
lated to DWL since the larger the degree of econo-
mies of scale, the larger the potential impact of
economies of scale on oligopoly power as a barrier
to entry.
In sum, Zj = (ADV,RC!2D,CONS,SCA LDUM,
MS,XS,H,M&A) is the vector of exogenous vari-
ables underlying 0, q, and l, to be used in assessing
the determinants of welfare losses. Thus, using
equation (4), DWL = flZj). Consider a log-linear
version of this function to obtain the following
relationship:
(5) in DWL = y. + Y1 in ADV+ y2 in R&D
+ y3 SCALDUM + y4 In CONS
+y51n H+-y61n XS+y71n MS
+ yg in M&A+ U,
where in is the natural log operator, the ys are
parameters to be estimated, and U is a random
disturbance. From the discussion above, all the ys
except y, are expected to be positive.
The observations for the dependent variable are
from table 1. Other data sources included Pagou-
latos and Sorenson (1986) for R&D and Connor et
al. (1985) for ADV, both of these variables are
expressed as a percentage of industry sales. CONS
is constructed from input-output tables (U.S. De-
partment of Commerce 1992), The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index and industry sales were obtained
from the 1987 Census of Manufacturers (U.S. De-
partment of Commerce). Export and import data
were obtained from a computer tape supplied by
the U.S. International Trade Commission (1990).
The economies of scale data were from Bhuyan
and Lopez (1997).
Obtaining mergers and acquisitions data at the
four-digit SIC level was the most difficult task in
terms of data collection because of the paucity of
publicly available merger data at that level of ag-
gregation. The publication Mergers and Acquisi-
tion was the principal source of mergers and ac-
quisitions data used in this study.3 The M&A vari-
able is constructed as the ratio of mergers and
acquisitions values to industry sales. The param-
eters were estimated correcting for dependent-
variable heteroskedasticity (multiplicative model)
using the SHAZAM computer program.
Empirical Results
The deadweight loss estimates for each of the
thirty-eight industries are presented in table 1,both
in dollar terms and as percentages of 1987 sales.
Oligopoly-induced allocative efficiency losses in
the U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing indus-
tries were 5,03Y0of sales in 1987, which amounted
to over $15 billion. The average welfare losses in
the food industries (SIC 20) were 5.1990of sales orBhuyan and Lopez We~are Losses from Oligopoly Power 261
Table 1. Welfare Loss Estimates for the U.S. Food and Tobacco Industries, 1987
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Notes: Rank = rank of DWL, where DWL = estimates of percentage welfare losses. Data at the two-digit level are simple averages
of the respective sample industries.
almost $14.95 billion, while similar losses in the
tobacco industries (SIC 21) amounted to over 3.6’%o
of sales or over $759 million. In terms of their
rankings, the prepared breakfast cereal industry
(SIC 2043) had the highest percentage of allocative
efficiency losses, while the pet food industry (SIC
2047) showed the smallest percentage loss. Previ-
ous studies with similar objectives (e.g., Winner
1989; Bhuyan and Lopez 1995) have found evi-
dence of the same higher than average welfare
losses. It is noteworthy that some of these indus-
tries (e.g., SIC 2043, SIC 2082, SIC 2095, and SIC
2111) have been the focus of antitrust investiga-
tions in the past.
The regression results for equation (5) are pre-
sented in table 2. All the coefficients of the ex-
planatory variables were statistically significant at
the 9970 level. The beta coefficients suggest that
import penetration was the most important factor
in determining allocative efficiency losses in the
U.S. food and tobacco industries, followed by ex-
port intensity, advertising intensity, economies of
scale, mergers and acquisitions, market concentra-
tion, R&D intensity, and finally the least important262 Oc~ober 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 2. Determinants of Welfare Losses in the U.S. Food and Tobacco Industries (N = 38)
Dependent variable: In DWL’
Beta Coefficient
Variable Notation Coefficient Expected Sign t-Ratio (Absolute)
Constant 1 -3.560 * -14,81
Advertising intensity in ADV 0.776 + 21.56 0.338
R&D intensity in R&D -0,051 + -6.637 0.099
Share of consumer product in CONS 0,275 + 5.875 0.090
Economies of scale (dummy)’ SC~LDUM 0,880 + 6.204 0.285
Market concentration’ in H 0.377 + 5.085 0,101
Import penetration in MS -0,468 — -21.860 0,672
Export intensity in XS 0.306 •!- 17.800 0.339
Mergers & acquisitions in M&A 1.067 + 5.085 0.257
NOTE:(a) The regression was corrected for multiplicative heteroskedasticity; (b) Economies of scale dummy = 1 implies an
industry with scale economies according to Bhuyan and Lopez (1997); (c) the market concentration variable (H) is the predicted
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as described in note 5
factor among all—share of sales to final consum-
ers,5
The empirical finding (table 2) that higher ad-
vertising intensity causes higher welfare loss is
consistent with the findings of Connor and Peter-
son (1992) that food industry price cost margins
are positively and significantly influenced by ad-
vertising. Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1986) argue
that advertising facilitates oligopolistic pricing by
lowering elasticity of demand and contend that ad-
vertising may lead to greater collusion. In the
present context, however, welfare losses from ad-
vertising do not necessarily imply that advertising
leads to collusion. An extensive literature exists on
this debate, the resolution of which is beyond the
scope of this paper (see Schmalensee 1986 for a
discussion of this issue).
Contrary to expectations, empirical results show
that research and development (R&D) has a salu-
tary impact on welfare loss, potentially reducing
welfare loss due to market power. Past studies
(Imel, Behr, and Helmberger 1972; Scahill 1985)
have recognized the potential dual (and conflict-
ing) impact of R&D on competition and conse-
quently on welfare loss. The impact of R&D on
market behavior also depends on whether the re-
search activity is devoted to product development
or process innovation (Scahill 1985; Lunn 1986).
Although the food and tobacco industries have
very low R&D intensities relative to other indus-
tries (NSF 1989), there is ample evidence that
much of the R&D expenditure is targeted at new
product development (Connor et al. 1985).
Results also show that the share of sales made
directly to consumer outlets (CONS) is positively
and significantly correlated with the allocative ef-
ficiency losses. Consumers’ (or wholesalers’/
retailers’) countervailing power is often absent be-
cause of the more frequent and lower average sales
value to final household consumers, leading to po-
tentially higher welfare losses (Gabel 1983), This
study provides support for that argument.
As hypothesized, the results in table 2 show that
the potential for increased welfare loss is higher in
industries with economies of scale because they
can create barriers to entry, hence increasing oli-
gopoly power and consequently allocative effi-
ciency losses. Table 2 also confirms the positive
and significant impact of market concentration on
allocative efficiency, consistent with the hypoth-
esis that industrial concentration leads to oligopo-
listic conduct (Caves et al. 1980; Eckard 1994).
The results also confirm the disciplinary effect
of imports, which has a countervailing effect on
oligopoly-induced welfare losses. The export share
variable shows positive and significant impact on
welfare loss in the food and tobacco industries, an
effect which, as Field and Pagoulatos (1996) have
hypothesized, may be due to the ability of U.S.
food and tobacco manufacturers to engage in in-
ternational price discrimination, partly aided by
tariff protections. Regarding the impact of mergers
and acquisitions, empirical results suggest that
food and tobacco industries with higher mergers
and acquisitions intensity incur greater welfare
losses. Although there is a lack of relevant studies
in the literature for comparison and substantiation
of this finding, the negative implications of merg-
ers, namely, a reduction in the level of competition
in a market, are pointed out by Auerbach and Re-
ishus (1991). This finding lends support to the hy-
pothesis that mergers and acquisitions potentially
reduce competition in a market and thereby reduce
social welfare.Bhuyan and Lopez We!/are Losses from Oligopoly Power 263
Conclusions
This study examined the determinants of allocative
efficiency losses in thirty-eight food and tobacco
industries in the United States. First, oligopoly
welfare losses were computed using econometri-
cally estimated conjectural variation, product de-
mand, and marginal cost elasticities. Second, the
determinants of these losses were identified via a
regression model using the computed welfare
losses as a dependent variable and market structure
characteristics as explanatory variables.
The empirical findings show that welfare losses
are higher in industries that also have higher ad-
vertising intensities, confirming the role of differ-
entiated products in enhancing oligopolistic pric-
ing conduct. The impact of research and develop-
ment on welfare losses was negative or salutary,
perhaps showing the potential impact on cost re-
duction and thereby outweighing the potential del-
eterious barrier to entry effects. This study also
confirms the negative effect of import penetration
on domestic aggregate welfare, while raising the
question of the impact of increased exports on do-
mestic welfare. Welfare losses were higher in mar-
kets with economies of scale and high market con-
centration, possibly showing the direct and indirect
effects of scale economies on market power. Wel-
fare losses were also higher in markets dealing
with finished consumer products, a reflection of
the lack of countervailing power of buyers, such as
supermarkets. Finally, findings indicate that wel-
fare losses are strongly and positively determined
by mergers and acquisitions intensities, confirming
the undesirable impact of mergers on competition,
Several outcomes of this study may have useful
policy implications. For instance, the finding on
the impact of mergers and acquisitions on compe-
tition and welfare raises the issue of the need to
examine merger petitions more closely from an
allocative (not technical) efficiency viewpoint.
Similarly, the findings on advertising further con-
tribute to the much-debated issue of the role and
impact of advertising and its relationship to market
structure measurements such as concentration. Ex-
tending the current analysis to include technical
efficiency considerations or formally modeling the
relationships among some of the independent vari-
ables may prove a fruitful avenue for further re-
search.
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1. There is a small but growing literature quanti-
fying the impact of various forms of oligopoly con-
duct and demand/cost assumptions on the esti-
mated welfare losses via simulation analysis
(Dickson and Yu 1989; Winner 1989; Winner and
Stilhl 1992; Peterson and Connor 1995; Bhuyan
and Lopez 1995). These studies are different from
the current study in two ways, First, those studies
assess the importance of model assumptions, i.e.,
how would the welfare loss change if a different
demand elasticity were assumed or if firms are in a
Cottrnot or price leadership regime? In contrast, in
the present analysis, the underlying model is a
maintained hypothesis; therefore, the estimated
welfare losses are treated as data. Second, results
of previous studies should be regarded as counter-
factual experiments and, thus, are not focused on
explaining the “observed” welfare losses. The
present study goes further than past studies by con-
sidering the determinants of observed welfare
losses.






-(1 -9)m((3+ h)]* 100,
where % is the Lerner index defined in equation
(l), lIt = q/(1 - q), h = d(e+ 1), and w = [c(1
- T]l/(q + f). Note that 13,~, and w are introduced
for slrnphclty of expression.
3, Mergers and Acquisitions is the principal source
of publicly available merger information. It records
merger, acquisition, and divestiture transactions in-
volving a U.S. company valued at $1 million or
more in cash, market value of capital stock, or debt
securities issued. Although it reports the frequency
of completed merges in a particular year, say 1985,
at the two-digit SIC level (e.g., SIC 20 and 21),
complete information on the value of mergers for
each transaction is not available, nor is the aggre-
gate value of mergers and acquisitions at the four-
digit level. However, this publication provides a
merger summary for high-value mergers for each
year, which comprise the bulk of merger values in
a particular industry. To remedy any missing data
problem and to take into account the lag effect of
mergers, we used aggregate merger values for the
years 1985, 1986, and 1987 to construct the M&A
variable.
Another public domain source of merger data is
Megerstat, published by Houlihan Lokey HowardBhuyan and Lopez
& Zukin (www.hlhz.tom). Among commercial
sources, the Securities Data Company (SDC) is a
well-known source (www.securitiesdata.tom).
4. In order to determine which variables contribute
the most to the regression, the beta coefficient
takes into account the effect of a typical or
“equally likely” change in the variable, using
sample standard deviations as a measure of typical
change. The absolute values of the beta coeffi-
cients were calculated by multiplying the estimated
coefficients by the standard deviation of each re-
gressor and dividing by the standard deviation of
the dependent variable.
5. Although the dependent variable was generated
We~are Losses from Oligopoly Power 265
via a NEIO approach, equation (5) is in the spirit of
the more traditional structure-conduct paradigm.
Therefore, the endogeneity of some of the vari-
ables (industrial concentration in particular) is po-
tentially troublesome. To partially address this
problem, a generalized instrumental variable ap-
proach (Harvey 1983) was used for industrial con-
centration. Based on the work of Martin (1979) and
Mueller and Rogers (1980), t}e Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index was predicted (H) for the sample
industries based on four-flrrn concentration, adver-
tising intensity, minimum efficiency scale, etc.
Then the predicted variable was used as an instru-
mental variable.